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INTRODUCTION
The world is just at the dawn of the Internet revolution, a revolu-
tion that promises both benefits and new sets of challenges, if not
problems. The benefits manifest themselves in political, economic,
and social dimensions. The policy challenges are more numerous, but
four in particular have attracted significant attention: privacy, intel-
lectual property protection, taxation, and “open access” to high-speed
or “broadband” networks.
In this Essay, I survey the benefits of the Internet and then out-
line a framework for dealing with the aforementioned policy issues.1
My approach is eclectic. I doubt that the four issues will (or should)
be resolved either by the market or by government alone, and thus I
recommend a judicious mix of the two. I also want to be clear that in
the fast-moving Internet environment, policymakers’ first instinct
should be to rely on markets and technology to address troublesome
issues and to act only if there are identifiable market failures that can
be corrected usefully by some type of government intervention. Fur-
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1. For three of the most thorough discussions of the many of the issues analyzed here, see
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999); CATHERINE L. MANN
ET AL., GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: A POLICY PRIMER 13 (2000); and Developments—
The Law of Cyberspace, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1574 (1999).
LITAN 03/08/01  11:09 AM
1046 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:1045
thermore, when government action is warranted, it should maximize
the opportunities for achieving social benefits while minimizing any
disadvantages or downsides—a guide that is as applicable to the
“real” world as it is to the “virtual” world.
Policy issues relating to the Internet have loomed larger as the
use of the Net has grown. In just four years, the Net had attracted
fifty million users, the fastest pace of adoption of any communications
technology in history. By contrast, it took thirteen years for television
and seventy-four years for the telephone to reach the same number of
users.2 As of January 2000, more than seventy-two million computers
from more than 220 countries were connected to the Internet.3 Inter-
net penetration is projected to continue increasing. Perhaps even
more important, the speed of access is also projected to advance for
any single user by leaps and bounds once various “broadband” tech-
nologies—cable, wireless, or enhanced services over conventional
copper telephone lines—are installed more universally.
I shall assume that by now readers are familiar with the origins of
the Internet and its basic features.4 The Internet was launched by the
federal government as a tool for university researchers to communi-
cate with each other and with the government.5 The Net has since be-
come a vehicle or highway—or whatever metaphor one wants to
choose—for commercial activity. This happened because of the de-
velopment of browsers in the 1990s.6 Browsers enable users to find
2. Challenges to the Network: Internet for Development 4, International Telecommunica-
tions Union, at http://www.itu.int/ti/publications/INET_99/chal_exsum.pdf (Oct. 1999) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal).
3. MANN ET AL., supra note 1, at 13.
4. For more thorough accounts of the Internet’s history and origins, see TIM BERNERS-
LEE & MARK FISCHETTI, WEAVING THE WEB: THE ORIGINAL DESIGN AND ULTIMATE
DESTINY OF THE WORLD WIDE WEB BY ITS INVENTOR (1999); A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong
Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE
L.J. 17 (2000); and Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J.
187 (2000). For a more detailed legal guide to the many of the issues treated here, see Develop-
ments—The Law of Cyberspace, supra note 1.
5. The Internet was initially developed by the Defense Department in the late 1960s.
LESSIG, supra note 1, at 4.
6. The initial browser, Gopher, was developed by researchers at the University of Minne-
sota and was text-based. Shortly thereafter, Marc Andreesan and his colleagues at the Univer-
sity of Illinois developed the more user-friendly Mosaic, which was later commercialized by
Netscape. Microsoft followed with a similar browser, Internet Explorer, which the company in-
corporated in its Windows operating system—a step that led to the now well-known antitrust
case that the government successfully brought against the company. United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000) (order); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d
30 (D.D.C. 2000) (conclusions of law); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9
(D.D.C. 2000) (findings of fact). At the time of this writing, that case is on appeal to the United
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what they are looking for on the Net virtually instantaneously and
thus enable commerce. The development of commerce, in turn, has
generated strong and continuing demand for the Net itself. It is the
use of the Net by private individuals and firms that has spawned de-
bate about how, or whether, to translate various legal and policy
frameworks familiar in the physical world to the world of “cyber-
space,” a world that seems to have no geographic location other than
on the computers that reside on the network we call the Internet.
I.  THE BENEFITS OF THE INTERNET
Internet enthusiasts have gushed about the potential promises of
the Internet. Some proclaim it to be as important, if not more impor-
tant, than the Industrial Revolution. That may turn out to be true, but
frankly, no one will know for some time. In this part, I take a more
pedestrian but still somewhat optimistic slant by briefly reviewing
three ways the Internet is likely to prove beneficial (although not
without some drawbacks).
A. Political Benefits
One of the most commonly noted political trends in America is
the steady decline in voter turnout. Robert Putnam has described a
parallel decline in civic involvement in his widely acclaimed Bowling
Alone.7 In principle, the Internet can help offset this tendency by fa-
cilitating more direct contact between citizens and their government
in many routine functions and by reducing the costs of connecting in-
dividuals with common viewpoints who otherwise may not know
about each other in order to achieve shared ends.
At the government-to-citizen level, all levels of government in
this country are already using the Net to make information available
about their activities, how government money is spent, and how to
register complaints and views with relevant agencies and officials. In
addition, governments are trying to catch up to the commercial sector
by offering ways to “do business” with the government—register cars,
renew drivers’ licenses, pay property and income taxes, and so on—
without having to show up physically at government offices and wait
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit after a decision by the Supreme
Court in late September 2000 not to expedite review of the matter. Microsoft Corp. v. United
States, 121 S. Ct. 25, 25 (2000).
7. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 48-64 (2000).
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in long lines. In all of these ways, the Net is bringing ordinary citizens
in closer contact with their governments. This should, in turn, in-
crease citizen involvement in governmental and political activities.8
In fact, there is evidence that this is happening. For example, in
1998 the FDIC proposed a set of rules designed to detect drug-related
money laundering.9 These “Know Your Customer” rules would have
required banks to obtain various types of information from potential
clients before accepting their accounts. The rules generated a fire-
storm of protests from individuals and groups concerned about pri-
vacy, who promptly conveyed their views to the regulators.10 The re-
sponse was so quick and overwhelming that the agency withdrew the
proposed rules.11
More broadly, during the 2000 presidential primaries, each of the
major candidates used websites to promote his views and, perhaps
more significantly, to solicit money. Interestingly, the two major un-
successful challengers—Bill Bradley and John McCain—were each
more successful in raising money through the Internet during the
primary campaign than the eventual winners in their respective par-
ties.12
The Internet has also facilitated political organizational activity
that has crossed national borders. The campaign against land mines
was organized by e-mail.13 So was the opposition to the Multilateral
Agreement on Investment (MAI), a proposal by countries belonging
to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) to relax restrictions on cross-border investment.14 The oppo-
sition from environmental and labor organizations in various devel-
oped countries was so intense that OECD member governments were
8. For an extensive discussion of the ways in which the Internet can improve the workings
of government, see Jane Fountain, The Economic Impact of the Internet on the Government
Sector, in THE ECONOMIC PROMISE OF THE INTERNET (Brookings Internet Task Force, forth-
coming 2001).
9. Minimum Security Devices and Procedures and Bank Secrecy Act Compliance, 63 Fed.
Reg. 67,529 (Dec. 7, 1998) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 326).
10. Minimum Security Devices and Procedures and Bank Secrecy Act Compliance, 64 Fed.
Reg. 14,845 (Mar. 29, 1999) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 326).
11. Id.
12. John Mintz, McCain Camp Enjoys a Big Net Advantage, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2000, at
A1.
13. Elaine Sciolino, It Turns Out That All Global Politics Is Local, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7,
1997, § 4, at 3.
14. Vanessa Houlder, Power Through Professionalism: Environment Campaigning, FIN.
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2000, at 16.
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forced to withdraw the proposal.15 Then there was the infamous pro-
test in Seattle at the December 1999 ministerial meeting of the World
Trade Organization, a meeting which was aimed at setting the next
agenda for multilateral trade negotiations. Marches and sporadic
violence disrupted the meetings and drew worldwide attention. In-
deed, the protesters claimed credit for the failure of the ministerial
meeting itself, although, in fact, governments had not formed a suffi-
cient consensus on the outcome prior to meeting to have guaranteed
a positive result.16 Nonetheless, the protests galvanized opposition to
further trade liberalization, and this opposition remains in both the
United States and in other (mostly developed) countries today.
Somewhat ironically, the use of the Internet—a global phenome-
non—by the opponents of globalization highlights the potential
power of the new technology. Never before have so many people in
so many different places throughout the globe been able to organize
so quickly and effectively to voice their views and to plan joint politi-
cal activity. At the same time, however, the MAI and Seattle experi-
ences indicate that the greater democracy unleashed by the Internet
may not always be a force for good (although the protesters may cer-
tainly think so). There is a remarkable consensus among economists
about the virtues of unrestricted trade—namely, that it will lead to
lower prices, improved quality, and higher overall wages (due to en-
hanced productivity).17 These virtues will be promoted if trade liber-
alization proceeds, even in the face of opposition facilitated by the
Internet.
The potential downside of Internet-based democracy may also be
revealed if and when Internet voting becomes widespread. During the
2000 presidential primaries, the state of Arizona allowed voting by
Internet, although it was challenged in court on the ground that un-
even access among Arizona residents would unfairly tilt the electoral
15. Id.
16. James L. Kenworthy, The Unraveling of the Seattle Conference and the Future of the
WTO, 5 GEO. PUB. POL. REV. 103, 103-16 (Spring 2000), http://www.georgetown.edu/
publications/GPPR (on file with the Duke Law Journal); Interview with Jagdish Bhagwati, in
Kentworthy, supra, http://www.georgetown.edu/publications/GPPR/52bhag.htm (on file with
the Duke Law Journal); Interview with Robert Litan, in Kentworthy, supra,
http://www.georgetown.edu/publications/GPPR/52litan.htm (on file with the Duke Law Jour-
nal).
17. I have discussed this subject at length, together with other colleagues, in GARY
BURTLESS ET AL., GLOBAPHOBIA: CONFRONTING FEARS ABOUT OPEN TRADE (1998).
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playing field toward those with computers and modems in their
homes.18
A burgeoning future for widespread Internet voting is not hard
to see. It is likely to arrive once there are assurances, first, that such
voting is secure from hackers and, second, that there are reasonable
opportunities for voters of all incomes to access the Internet. In fact,
one early form of Internet “vote trading” was encouraged by sup-
porters of Ralph Nader in the 2000 presidential election.19 Fearing
charges that a vote for Nader could cost Vice President Gore the elec-
tion, some Nader supporters encouraged voters in states likely to vote
solidly for Gore to support Nader in return for promises by those
Nader supporters in states where the race was tight to vote for Gore.
Apparently some Nader voters actually completed their trades.20
Internet voting, like other things associated with the Internet, has
its pluses and potential minuses. On the plus side, voting by Internet
should increase participation rates, because it becomes so much easier
to get to the polls. Indirect evidence of this effect can be found in ex-
traordinarily high voter participation rates in Oregon—in excess of
80%—during the 2000 election, where voting was permitted only by
mail.21 This experiment suggests that when people do not have to ven-
ture out of their homes to vote, they are more likely to do so.
A potential downside of the Internet in the political arena, how-
ever, is that the ease of organizing petition campaigns (where peti-
tions may be signed with “digital signatures”) over the Net may
prompt much greater use of citizen-based initiatives of the type that
have so been popular in California (even before the Internet was
widely used). Once security is assured, there is no reason, at least in
principle, why ballot initiatives cannot be developed virtually instan-
taneously, with the required number of digital signatures attained
through e-mail campaigns.
To some, the prospect of voter-driven initiatives may be democ-
racy at its best. “Electronic town meetings” are one of the things Ross
18. Ben White, Online Balloting: A Question of Fairness; Justice Department Challenges
Arizona’s Use of Voting by Computer in Primary, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2000, at A9.
19. Daniel J. Wakin, Vote Trading Via the Net a New Twist for Democracy, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 31, 2000, at A20.
20. One site, VoteExchange.com, reported that it matched more than 6,000 Gore and
Nader voters. Shailagh Murray, Nader’s Cause Could Pay for His Spoiler Role: Consumer Ad-
vocate Would Make Enemies If Bush Wins Election, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2000, at A17.
21. News Release, Oregon Office of the Secretary of State, Oregon Ranks Ninth in Voter
Participation (Nov. 28, 2000), http://www.sos.state.or.us/executive/pressrel/112800.html (on file
with the Duke Law Journal).
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Perot promised to bring to federal decisionmaking during his 1992
presidential campaign. To others, however, the notion that individu-
als will be able to click their position more easily on one of many is-
sues du jour is not how our democracy is supposed to work. Instead,
we live in a representative democracy, one that relies on political lead-
ers elected by the people to make choices on tough issues. Elections
are held for the purpose of choosing the agents to whom we delegate
this power, not for the purpose of having individuals make important
public decisions themselves. A system of cyber-voting coupled with
electronically enabled ballot initiatives could easily degenerate into a
“knee-jerk” democracy dominated by the whims and emotions of the
electorate at particular points in time. In this sense, the future could
resemble the very distant past: direct democracy in ancient Athens
degenerated into mob rule, especially after the age of Pericles.22
For now, however, such worst-case outcomes are speculative at
best. So far, at least, the Internet has promoted citizen participation in
public life at many levels—local, national, and international—and
thereby has helped reduce citizen alienation from what can often
seem like abstract and distant decisionmaking processes. Improve-
ments in process do not guarantee improvements in the results of de-
cisions. To put it differently, information may be power, but history
teaches that power can and often has been misused. We shall have to
wait for some years before knowing whether the Internet will help or
harm our political process.
B. Economic Benefits
The performance of the U.S. economy during the 1990s was ex-
traordinary, especially during the last five years of the decade. During
this period, the economy became more productive at an annual rate
of about 3%, or double the 1.5% rate of increase over the previous
two decades.23 What is most remarkable about this achievement is
22. THE LANDMARK THUCYDIDES: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO THE PELOPONNESIAN
WAR 127-28 (Robert B. Strassler ed., Richard Crawley trans., Free Press 1996):
Pericles indeed, by his rank, ability, and known integrity, was enabled to exercise an
independent control over the multitude—in short, to lead them instead of being led
by them . . . . With his successors it was different. More on a level with one another,
and each grasping at supremacy, they ended by committing even the conduct of state
affairs to the whims of the multitude. This, as might have been expected in a great
and sovereign state, produced a host of blunders, and amongst them the Sicilian ex-
pedition . . . .
23. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 83 (Feb. 2000), http://w3.access.gpo.gov/eop
(on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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that it came relatively late in the economic cycle. In past economic
expansions, firms have found it harder to make their companies more
productive as they dug deeper into the labor pool.24 This time around,
productivity surged even as firms took on more workers—a totally
unexpected development. The productivity boom in turn allowed
firms to increase wages at a faster pace than in earlier years without
threatening an acceleration of inflation.
There is a widespread consensus among economists that ad-
vances in high technology—especially computers, the prices of which
have been falling at an annual clip of roughly 30% per year—have
been a major reason why productivity has increased rapidly.25 The
consensus breaks down over the contribution of computers to the
economic performance of the rest of the economy. One of the leading
skeptics, Robert Gordon of Northwestern University, finds no evi-
dence of such “spillover effects” outside the manufacturing sector.26
Two former skeptics, Stephen Oliner and Dan Sichel, recently came
to a different conclusion. They find statistical support for the notion
that the diffusion of computer and information technologies has
benefited firms throughout the economy.27 The President’s Council of
Economic Advisers essentially agrees.28 Somewhat in the middle are
Dale Jorgenson and Kevin Stiroh, who agree with Gordon that pro-
ductivity advances in the information technology (IT) sector have
been important contributors to the improvement in overall produc-
tivity growth but who also find significant technological advances in
the rest of the economy.29 They profess to be unable to sort out
whether the productivity growth in the non-IT sector is due to spill-
overs from the advances in IT or from sources that are entirely inde-
pendent of the IT revolution.30
The dispute about the impact of the high-tech revolution is per-
haps most visible when it comes to the Internet. Enthusiasts who
24. Id. at 35.
25. For a thorough discussion of the role of technology in contributing to recent U.S. eco-
nomic performance, see Alan S. Blinder, The Internet and the New Economy, BROOKINGS
POL’Y BRIEF, No. 60 (2000).
26. Robert J. Gordon, Does The “New Economy” Measure Up to the Great Inventions of
the Past?, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 49, 57 (2000).
27. Stephen D. Oliner & Daniel E. Sichel, The Resurgence of Growth in the Late 1990s: Is
Information Technology the Story?, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 3-22 (2000).
28. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 23, at 98, 112.
29. Dale W. Jorgenson & Kevin J. Stiroh, Raising the Speed Limit: U.S. Economic Growth
in the Information Age, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 125-211 (2000).
30. Id.
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work in the industry—often centered in Silicon Valley—tend to take
it on faith that the Net is in the process of working a vast improve-
ment in the performance of the U.S. economy. At the other extreme,
skeptics such as Robert Gordon claim that although the Internet may
appear significant to many today, in fact, other inventions such as the
telegraph, the automobile, air conditioning, and electricity have had
much greater impacts on the economy and the rest of society.31 So far,
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan—whose words and ac-
tions probably count the most—has sided with the optimists. He has
suggested that the effect of all of the information technologies to-
gether (including the Internet) “could rival and arguably even surpass
the impact the telegraph had prior to, and just after, the Civil War.”32
The truth is that we will not know for some years, perhaps a dec-
ade or more, what impact the information revolution, and the rapid
growth of the Internet in particular, will have on long-term produc-
tivity, growth, inflation, and other measures of aggregate economic
performance. The reason is that the use of the Internet for commer-
cial activities—searches for the best prices and products and comple-
tion of transaction—is in its infancy. Although the latest estimates of
e-commerce for the year 2000 (primarily business-to-business) range
in the hundreds of billions of dollars, commercial activity using the
Internet is widely expected to be counted in the trillions of dollars,
here and worldwide, in just a few years.33
On theoretical grounds, there are reasons for believing that the
growing use of the Internet for commercial activity will have a posi-
tive impact on productivity, at least during the time it takes for the
best uses of the Net to diffuse throughout the economy. In principle,
the Internet should enable firms to reduce the costs of carrying inven-
tory, obtaining and managing necessary supplies, and dealing with
customers. These are all impacts that, at least theoretically, can be
measured. In addition, the Internet allows consumers greater choice
in products and services—a positive impact that is difficult, if not im-
possible, to quantify—as well as the ability to find the least expensive
and most suitable products and services.
31. Gordon, supra note 26, at 59-60.
32. Alan Greenspan, Improving Our Understanding of Productivity, THE REGION, June
2000, at 9.
33. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, DIGITAL ECONOMY 2000, at 15-18 (2000),
http://www.esa.doc.gov (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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To ascertain how large these beneficial impacts might be, the
Brookings Institution asked a group of academic experts to look out
over at least the next five years and provide a plausible range of esti-
mates for eight sectors of the U.S. economy: automobile manufac-
turing and sales, non-auto manufacturing, higher education and pri-
vate-sector training, financial services, government, health care,
retailing, and trucking.34 These eight sectors collectively account for
more than 70% of annual gross domestic product (GDP). By their na-
ture, the results are, at best, informed speculation about the possible
impacts of the Internet in each of these sectors. Nonetheless, the
findings are revealing. Broadly speaking, they suggest that e-
commerce—primarily that between businesses (B2B)—should in-
crease annual productivity growth by at least several tenths of a per-
cent. This estimate does not mean that productivity growth will be
even higher than the extraordinary 3% annual growth achieved in re-
cent years, but instead it is simply a projection that such growth is
likely to be somewhat larger than it would otherwise be on account of
networked computing. It is tempting to dismiss the importance of an-
nual productivity growth improvements measured in tenths of a per-
cent, but even a 0.3% improvement—which would be consistent with
the kinds of projections that our study claims is possible—would, if
cumulated over a ten-year period, translate into higher levels of GDP
of perhaps 3%—more than $1000 in additional purchasing power for
every man, woman, and child in the United States.35
C. Social Benefits
One of most widely advertised benefits of the Internet is that it is
providing new “social” benefits through the creation of new cyber-
communities. Unlike their physical counterparts, the cyber- or virtual
communities are not defined by geographic proximity; instead, they
are defined by interest. There are now chat rooms for seemingly any-
one and anything. Many individuals somehow feel freer and more
able to communicate when writing e-mails and notes to bulletin
boards than when speaking directly to other individuals. People with
life-threatening illnesses have found new support groups on the Net.
Perhaps the most enthusiastic users of the new technology are aca-
34. The findings will be summarized in ROBERT E. LITAN & ALICE M. RIVLIN, BEYOND
THE DOT.COMS (forthcoming 2001).
35. This calculation is based on a per-capita income of approximately $35,000 in 1999 and
on figures in the ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 23.
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demic scholars, many of whom use the Internet daily to communicate
with other experts in their fields, as well as to collaborate on articles
or books in a fashion and at a speed that only a short time ago would
have been unimaginable.36
It is not clear that all Internet-empowered communities are posi-
tive developments. The heavy use of chat rooms by day traders has
been a mixed blessing, at best, for the stock market, driving many in-
vestors to trade on momentum rather than on the basis of fundamen-
tal values. Then there are the Internet hermits, who find it so com-
fortable to socialize on the Net that they neglect to develop or deepen
real life relationships. Perhaps most worrisome are hate groups that
have used the Internet to reach out to broader audiences and to re-
cruit new members.
On balance, however, there appears to be a consensus that the
community-building positives of the Net outweigh the negatives. In
any event, it really does not matter. The Net is here and only getting
bigger, and social relationships inevitably will adapt as it does.
II.  CONCERNS RAISED BY THE INTERNET
As with all new technologies, the Internet has raised a series of
concerns—some would say drawbacks—that are attracting increased
attention among policymakers. In fact, the number of such concerns
seems to proliferate as policymakers and citizens learn more about
the impact that the Net is having. As a result, I cannot possibly ad-
dress all of these issues. Instead I concentrate here on the implica-
tions of the Net in just four areas: privacy, intellectual property, taxa-
tion, and policies relating to broadband access to the Net. Each of
these issues raises a common challenge. Should policymakers inter-
vene now to mandate rules similar to those applicable in the “offline”
world, or should they wait and see whether markets and technology
will address the issue in a satisfactory manner?
Over time, three different answers to this question appear to
have emerged. Initially, the widespread presumption among policy-
makers and many academic scholars was that the Internet should be
kept as a “regulation-free” zone.37 The Net was viewed as an ideal ex-
36. For a thorough discussion of how the Internet is leading to important social changes,
see ANDREW L. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: HOW THE INTERNET IS PUTTING
INDIVIDUALS IN CHARGE AND CHANGING THE WORLD WE KNOW (1999).
37. E.g., David R. Johnson & David G. Post, And How Shall the Net Be Governed?: A
Meditation on the Relative Virtues of Decentralized, Emergent Law, in COORDINATING THE
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ample of unplanned, private-sector innovation, the benefits of which
could be curtailed, perhaps dramatically, by premature and ill-advised
government intervention. Moreover, by its very nature, the Net could
be impossible to regulate. An attempt by one jurisdiction to regulate
content on the Net, for example, or to impose taxes on transactions
completed over the Net, would simply prompt the host of the website
in question to move its server to a different location. I candidly admit
that when I began my own Internet-related policy research, I leaned
heavily toward this libertarian view (although, as elaborated below, I
have since altered my views somewhat).38 So did the Clinton admini-
stration, which offered a 1997 “White Paper” on Internet policy writ-
ten by Ira Magaziner. The White Paper essentially argued that the
private sector should take the lead on Internet issues, although some
modest role for government was still envisioned (primarily to help
close the so-called “digital divide”).39
As time has passed, and the issues that I am about to take up
(and others) have attracted increased attention, a counterreaction to
the libertarian approach has set in. Call it “interventionist” or “regu-
latory,” but the essential claim is that the Internet is too important
not to regulate. Professor Lawrence Lessig has become perhaps the
best known and most articulate proponent of this view, although oth-
ers have expressed similar ideas.40 In his book Code, Lessig outlines
the core of his argument: that the rules on the Net so far have been
written by software programmers (code writers), rather than legisla-
tors or regulators; that the code tends to be more restrictive than
policy in the physical world; and that unless elected officials step in
soon (Lessig has no confidence in judges getting things right), the
code writers will triumph.41 Lessig is more pessimistic than are per-
haps some other adherents of the regulatory model for the Internet,
INTERNET 62-91 (Brian Kahin & James H. Keller eds., 1997); David G. Post, Governing Cyber-
space, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 155, 157 (1996) (stating that “in the special circumstances of cyber-
space, no choice of law rule—no algorithm we can apply to the set of potentially applicable rule-
sets defined in geographic terms—can provide . . . a sensible answer” to Internet regulation).
Elsewhere, Johnson and Post argue for separate legal principles in “cyberspace.” David R.
Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV.
1367, 1367-1402 (1996).
38. ROBERT E. LITAN & WILLIAM NISKANEN, GOING DIGITAL! 67-81 (1998).
39. Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741 (1998),
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/6_5_98dns.htm (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
40. E.g., SHAPIRO, supra note 36, at 217-30 (asserting that a “balance between the market
and government” is necessary).
41. LESSIG, supra note 1, at 107-08.
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however, because he believes that legislative and regulatory gridlock
prevent the right policies from trumping the rules of the code writ-
ers.42
There is a third approach to Internet-related policy issues. It is
more optimistic and more eclectic, and I shall label it “pragmatic” for
lack of a better title. Under this view, to which I now subscribe, policy
questions of the kind I shall treat next should and will be met through
a combination of market and technological responses, as well as some
governmental involvement in particular cases, often more to facilitate
transition than as a permanent solution. The mix of markets and gov-
ernment will differ from issue to issue. In the long run market-based
responses will generally dominate (as they often do) and either ren-
der a policy reaction unnecessary or induce policy to move in a par-
ticular direction. To be sure, there are dangers that premature or in-
consistent and overlapping government involvement (from different
jurisdictions) may produce errors—and specifically cause markets to
veer off in different and less desirable directions than they otherwise
would pursue—but I remain somewhat optimistic that this result will
be avoided, or if not, that the damage will not be too great.
What about the libertarian claim that the Net has rendered gov-
ernments powerless to regulate? That may well be true for certain
smaller companies, nimble enough to avoid detection or to change lo-
cations at the drop of a hat. It is not likely to be the case with well-
recognized companies, such as Microsoft, AT&T, IBM, and many
other large companies that one could name. Such enterprises are
likely to have too much stake in the physical world to pull up stakes
and relocate simply out of a desire to avoid regulation of their Inter-
net activities. These “elephants” of enterprise can be counted on to
obey the law, whatever it is, unlike many of the “mice,” whose activi-
ties can be difficult to detect and whose efforts to avoid regulation
policymakers will have to live with.43
A. Privacy
One of the real “sleeper” political issues generated by the popu-
larity of the Internet is privacy, or the ability of consumers to control
42. Id. at 213-21.
43. The distinction between “elephants” and “mice” on the Internet was first introduced,
to my knowledge, in PETER SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD
DATA FLOWS AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE (1998). For further discussion, see
generally Peter P. Swire, Of Elephants, Mice and Privacy: International Choice of Law and the
Internet, 32 INT’L L. 991 (1998).
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what information about them others may be able to view or gain ac-
cess to on the Net. Privacy advocates claim that on the Net, there is
not much privacy at all. The mere act of visiting a website generally
triggers the placement of “cookies” on an individual’s computer.44
These cookies enable the website to welcome back a visitor, but they
also allow the operators of that website to read from the cookie what
other websites an individual has visited. This information may be sold
to third parties or kept by the website itself to ascertain consumer
preferences and target new product offerings more narrowly. Indeed,
one of the more successful businesses on the Internet involves the use
of cookie-generated information to target advertising to particular
users.45
Consumers are increasingly aware both that cookies exist and
that Internet-based search engines allow virtually anyone to find out
all kinds of personal information about virtually anybody else. It is,
therefore, not surprising that in popular opinion polls an overwhelm-
ing majority of Americans consistently report that they are deterred
from using the Internet more than they currently do because of pri-
vacy-related fears.46 For this reason, there appears to be significant
public support for some kind of government regulation to restore
consumers’ privacy on the Net.
This is not the approach favored by many private-sector firms
and opponents of government regulation. They argue that the mar-
ket, supplemented by technology and perhaps by industry “self-
regulation,” will provide precisely the level of privacy that consumers
desire. If consumers object to websites collecting data about them and
possibly forwarding it to third parties, consumers can choose not to
do business with the sponsors of those websites—just as consumers
can make the same choice with companies doing business that way in
the physical world. Furthermore, if consumers lack sufficient informa-
44. For a critique of cookies and other invasions of privacy made possible by the Internet,
see JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA
162-64 (2000).
45. A newer method for collecting information from web users is the “web bug,” or graphic
image files that are embedded in web pages or e-mails but which are invisible to the user. Rob-
ert O’Harrow Jr., Fearing a Plague of ‘Web Bugs’; Invisible Fact-Gathering Code Raises Privacy
Concerns, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1999, at E1. The web bug sends back to its home server mes-
sages that contain, among other things, the Internet Protocol (IP) address of the computer that
downloaded the bug, the time at which the page was viewed, and the identification number of
any cookie that has been placed on the user’s computer by that server. Id.
46. A well-known Harris survey has found that 92% of consumers are concerned and 67%
are “very concerned” about misuse of their personal data online. John Schwartz, Opting In: A
Privacy Paradox, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 2000, at H1, H4.
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tion to make these choices—as critics of the free-market approach
freely point out—then others have incentives to develop technologies
to provide that information and to enable consumers to act on it.
For example, the worldwide web consortium has produced a set
of computer instructions, collected under the label P3P, that enable
users to specify exactly how much personal information they will al-
low their computers to transmit to websites as they browse on the
Net. The P3P instructions will alert users if a website does not meet
their minimum criteria. As of mid-summer 2000, Microsoft was plan-
ning to introduce P3P in the next version of its browser.47 Similarly, in
August 2000, Microsoft introduced software enabling users to detect
whether third-party cookies—those deposited by web advertisers or
their agents, for example—have been planted on their computers and,
if so, to specify whether they wish to accept or reject them.48 The press
also has played an important role—albeit in a sporadic fashion—in
bringing to light information policies that consumers might find ob-
jectionable. For example, after the press reported that AOL planned
to sell its subscriber information to third parties, the company aban-
doned the policy.49 Similarly, press reports that certain state transpor-
tation departments intended to sell driver’s license photos to third
parties prompted Colorado, Florida, and South Carolina to stop that
practice as well.50
Then there is the private sector itself. The OnLine Privacy Alli-
ance (OPA), a consortium of high-tech and “old economy” compa-
nies, agreed on a set of voluntary guidelines in 1998. The guidelines
urged members to announce voluntarily their privacy policies—both
on and off the Net—and to offer consumers a choice to opt out of
having their information forwarded to third parties or used in any
way other than that for which the data were originally collected.51 The
OPA initiative is perhaps the best known of the “self regulatory” ini-
tiatives that were prompted by the threat of actual regulation. Advo-
47. Jerry Clausing, New Technology Is Aimed at Increasing Web Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, June
22, 2000, at C6.
48. The Microsoft “cookie detector” does not extend the same option to first-party cook-
ies, however, or those planted by Microsoft’s own websites. Third parties that collect informa-
tion through cookies on behalf of advertisers such as DoubleClick have objected to this distinc-
tion. The author serves on the privacy board of DoubleClick.
49. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, AOL Cancels Plan for Telemarketing, WASH. POST, July 25,
1997, at G1.
50. Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Firm Changes Plan to Acquire Photos, WASH. POST, Nov. 12,
1999, at E3.
51. Keith Perine, The Persuader, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, Nov. 13, 2000, at 154-70.
LITAN 03/08/01  11:09 AM
1060 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:1045
cates of this approach claim that it illustrates how the market can help
correct a problem without the need for actual government interven-
tion.
Finally, there are a number of well-known services—such as
TRUSTe and BBB Online—that will certify sites as having at least
announced a privacy policy on the Net and will audit whether they
adhere to those policies. Although these services do not require that
choice in any of its forms (opt-in or opt-out) or that the right of access
to information (another concern that privacy advocates have about
the Net) be made available, they at least can help assure the public
that what the sites say about their policies is true.
For all of these reasons, until early 2000, the official position of
the federal government—at least as embodied in announcements by
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which has become the de facto
monitor and potential federal regulator of privacy on the Net—was
that Net privacy was an issue better left to the market rather than to
the government.52 There were two exceptions. In the case of material
directed toward children under the age of thirteen, the FTC, under
instructions from the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of
1998 (section 1303), required websites to gain offline parental consent
before seeking to obtain personal information from minors.53 In addi-
tion, websites that advertised a privacy policy—such as promising not
to forward personal information to third parties without the user’s
consent—have to adhere to those policies; otherwise, they could be
held in violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
which bans “unfair trade practices.”54
The FTC has since abandoned its moderate hands-off policy to-
ward privacy on the Net. In large part, the Commission appears to
have done so in response to two surveys of websites it conducted. The
results of the first survey were announced in June 1998 and found that
only 14% of websites had even posted a privacy policy.55 The second,
follow-up study was released two years later.56 Although it showed
52. Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the Electronic Marketplace: A Report to
Congress ii-iii (May 2000), http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000/privacy2000.pdf (on file with
the Duke Law Journal) [hereinafter Fair Information Practice].
53. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998).
54. In fact, the FTC has penalized the Geocities website for violating such a policy and
sued the bankrupt online toy supplier Toysmart, Inc. for breaking its pledge not to sell its cus-
tomer lists. Matt Richtel, Toysmart.com in Settlement with F.T.C., N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2000, at
C1.
55. FTC, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 27 (June 1998).
56. Fair Information Practice, supra note 52, at 3.
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dramatic improvement—97% of the most popular sites and 62% of
randomly surveyed sites reporting having a privacy policy—it none-
theless revealed that only 20% of all sites surveyed met FTC stan-
dards for adequate privacy.57 The poor compliance figures appear to
have motivated the FTC in the summer of 2000 to request that Con-
gress provide the agency with the legal authority to issue rules man-
dating a set of requirements relating to the collection and dissemina-
tion of personal information acquired from users of the Net.58
The FTC’s embrace of government intervention represents a
more general shift in the regulatory direction on privacy issues. Both
major presidential candidates expressed sympathy with more federal
activity in the privacy arena. Immediately after the election, it was re-
ported that federal privacy legislation of some type—especially with
respect to medical and financial records—was likely to be high on the
congressional agenda in 2001.59 Although various federal and state
statutes already protect certain kinds of financial information, Con-
gress went further in 1999. As part of a sweeping overhaul of the na-
tion’s financial laws, Congress required that financial organizations
provide consumers with notices of their privacy policies and, with cer-
tain exceptions, afford them the right to opt out of having their per-
sonal information forwarded to third parties.60 The Clinton admini-
stration wanted even greater protections. Specifically, it wanted an
extension of the opt-out requirement for affiliates of financial institu-
tions belonging to the same overall organization. Eventually, the ad-
ministration accepted a compromise advocated by Senator Sarbanes
and others that allows the states to enact tougher privacy protections
(a problem I address below).
57. Id.
58. The Commission is not unanimous on this issue. Commissioner Orson Swindle has ob-
jected to government regulation of Net privacy. Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Orson
Swindle 5, in Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the Electronic Marketplace—A Re-
port to Congress (May 2000), http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000/swindledissent.pdf (on file
with the Duke Law Journal).
59. Jim VandeHei & David Rodgers, Election 2000: New Economy May Top Next Con-
gress’s Agenda, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2000, at A17.
60. This legislation was the Financial Modernization Act of 1999, or what has come to be
known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, named after the three main congressional committee
chairmen who shepherded the bill through Congress. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No.
106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
LITAN 03/08/01  11:09 AM
1062 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:1045
Nonetheless, during the summer of 2000, the administration pro-
posed that Congress adopt more sweeping privacy legislation.61 Its
proposal not only included the opt-out requirement for financial af-
filiates but also required that all financial organizations collecting in-
formation about credit card purchases and medical data give consum-
ers an opt-in right.62 An opt-in regime would prohibit the release of
information unless consumers explicitly and affirmatively authorize it.
In addition, the administration proposed giving consumers access to
information collected about them, while allowing data holders to as-
sess “reasonable” charges for doing so. Congress adjourned in Octo-
ber 2000 without taking up the proposal. Congress also considered
but did not create a commission to examine a broad range of privacy
issues and report back recommendations.63
Privacy on and off the Internet has become an important interna-
tional issue as well, driven by the Privacy Directive of 1995 adopted
by the European Union.64 In brief, beginning in 1998 the EU required
its member states to establish comprehensive privacy regimes afford-
ing EU citizens broad opt-out rights and specific protections—en-
forced by centralized government agencies and private rights of ac-
tion—for especially sensitive data. The directive defined especially
sensitive data as information about an individual’s religious beliefs,
sexual orientation, medical history, and financial situation. Most sig-
nificant from the standpoint of the United States, the directive threat-
ened to impose the equivalent of a “data embargo” on the export of
personal information about EU citizens to countries that did not, in
the judgment of the EU, provide “adequate” protections of such in-
formation. Throughout much of the late 1990s, officials of the EU and
the United States dickered back and forth about whether the patch-
work of U.S. laws governing privacy would satisfy the adequacy test.
If the EU or any of its member states had actually implemented the
embargo, it could have had a significant adverse impact not only on e-
commerce but also on commercial activities in general—and not just
61. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, The Clinton-Gore Plan to
Enhance Consumers’ Financial Privacy: Protecting Core Values in the Information Age (May 1,
2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
62. Id.
63. The bills in Congress were championed in the Senate by Senators Fred Thompson and
Herb Kohl and in the House of Representatives by Congressmen Asa Hutchison and James
Moran.
64. For an extensive discussion of this initiative, see SWIRE & LITAN, supra note 43, at 22-
49.
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on U.S. companies doing business in Europe but on European firms
doing business in the United States as well.65
In the end, the two sides agreed to what has been called a “safe
harbor.”66 The safe harbor allows U.S. companies doing business in
Europe to export personal data on EU citizens, provided that they
first satisfy the EU authorities that they have implemented data pro-
tections—notice, choice, and rights of access—that are essentially
equivalent to the rights accorded those same individuals under EU
law. Significantly for the United States, the EU agreed that the
American combination of self-regulation and FTC enforcement for
company violations of their self-proclaimed policies was sufficient—
without having to mimic the European Union’s more comprehensive
privacy regulatory system.
So what is the right approach to privacy on the Net? In my view,
we are destined to live with some combination of markets, technol-
ogy, and yes, some government intervention—the eclectic, and per-
haps philosophically messy, but nonetheless pragmatic approach to-
ward Internet policy that I outlined earlier. In fact, government
intervention has already arrived in both the online and offline worlds.
The main reason, I would submit, is that markets and technologies
alone have not so far guaranteed the delivery of the level of protec-
tion that consumers want. This is because many consumers are still
unaware of how the personal information they supply to a particular
website may be used or do not know how to opt out of having such
information forwarded to third parties. The law is moving in the di-
rection of mandating notice, some means of choice, and perhaps the
opportunity to access online databases to assure that personal infor-
mation individuals may have supplied in the past is still correct.
The critical questions for policymakers are whether the man-
dates—when they come, either from federal or state legislators—will
have unintended and undesirable consequences, and if so, whether
those consequences can be avoided. The danger of premature and
wrongly conceived regulation is of special concern in an environ-
ment—like that of the Internet—where technology is evolving rap-
idly. Policy should not get in the way of such technological evolution.
Instead it should provide protections during the transition toward
65. Id. at 43.
66. For a broad discussion of the EU Privacy Directive and the “safe harbor” proposal in
particular, see Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and In-
ternational Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 70-88
(2000).
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technological solutions, if not accelerate the introduction and use of
those solutions.
Some examples of the possible downside consequences of inap-
propriate privacy regulation and how those consequences so far have
been avoided are worth noting. When individuals write checks from
their bank accounts in order to make payments to merchants, they
may not know that their bank has outsourced the check-processing
function to a third party. Clearly, any rule that required consumers to
opt in to, or allowed them to opt out of, authorizing the sharing of
their personal banking information with such processors could add
significant costs to banking operations. For this reason, although the
Financial Modernization Act of 1999 gave consumers an opt-out right
on information sharing, it provided an exception for third-party serv-
icing of accounts and transfers necessary for joint marketing ar-
rangements (provided that the third parties maintain the confidenti-
ality of the information transferred).
A more general example is the importance of the free flow of fi-
nancial information to companies that compile credit information on
individuals and businesses. Credit reporting agencies allow banks and
other lenders to check the creditworthiness of potential borrowers
quickly and thus help ensure that the most creditworthy customers
obtain the lowest cost of credit consistent with market conditions and
are not charged the higher rates that are more appropriate for higher
risk customers. Precisely because credit information is so important,
Congress enacted the Fair Credit Reporting Act, which allows cus-
tomers to obtain access to their credit files to ensure that there are no
mistakes.67 Nonetheless, broader provisions aimed at restricting the
transfer of financial information in the first place could impede the
credit assessment process and thus either cause institutions to deny
credit where it may be inappropriate to do so or prevent lenders from
charging borrowers to whom they do extend credit interest rates that
accurately reflect the risks involved.
Yet another example relates to information gathering of adver-
tisement delivery services such as DoubleClick, which has been the
target of criticism because it tracks the Internet activity of users who
happen to click on websites that have asked DoubleClick to perform
that function. What made many people especially nervous—and what
triggered federal and state investigations—was a plan the company
announced in early 2000. The company intended to marry the data it
67. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994).
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compiled online about the behavior of individuals on their computer
with offline information obtained in a merger with a data marketer,
Abacus. This combination would have enabled DoubleClick to link
the computer user with his or her personal identity. Under the storm
of protest that followed, the company backed away from that plan.
Nonetheless, it is important not to overlook the fact that companies
such as DoubleClick provide a service of real use to consumers. By
aggregating all of the information it collects, DoubleClick and its
competitors can assist their web-based clients to deliver targeted on-
line advertisements to users, reducing costs and barriers to entry for
the sites themselves and the hassle of junk advertisements for web us-
ers. Indeed, ad targeting is of greater importance than ever before be-
cause of declining “click-through” rates, which are now less than one
half of one percent.68 Yet statutory or regulatory requirements, or
even technologies such as Microsoft’s “cookie alert” that discriminate
against third-party cookies, can have the effect of increasing the costs
of marketing, leading to increased costs for products and possibly re-
duced choice (to the extent some sites are forced off the Net) for con-
sumers.
In short, privacy-related mandates can be costly, and those costs
can show up in ways that may not be fully anticipated at the time they
are imposed. In addition, privacy mandates—especially if they are
written too prescriptively—could impede the development of even
better technologies than those now available to give consumers
greater power over their information without, at the same time, im-
peding the flow of information that now facilitates commerce. I per-
sonally do not believe that legislation of the type the Clinton admini-
stration proposed—an opt-out default for the transfer of most
personal information, but an opt-in requirement for especially sensi-
tive information, such as medical records and credit card spending
patterns—would produce costs in excess of the benefits it promises in
giving consumers more effective control over their personal data. I
stress that this is a personal judgment, however, and I am not aware
of any studies on the costs and benefits of such a mandate. Nonethe-
less, I believe there is a strong case for having at least some standard
federal privacy standards that would preempt state legislation in this
area. State legislation already has been invited by the Financial Mod-
68. Vijay D’Silva et al., Plastic Explosive, MCKINSEY Q., Fall 2000, at 43, 47,
www.mckinseyquarterly.com/pdf/plex00.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal). The “click-
through rate” measures the percentage of online users who see a banner ad and then click on it
to see what information it conveys. Id. at 47.
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ernization Act in connection with financial services.69 A system of fifty
different legal regimes for privacy is ill-suited to a marketplace, such
as that created by the Internet, where geographic borders are essen-
tially irrelevant. They can become relevant and excessively costly if
the governments inside those borders begin erecting different legal
structures for transactions depending on the location of the consumer
or the provider.
In the long run, however, the cyber-libertarians are likely to have
their day, too. Technology and markets ultimately should empower
consumers to provide the amount of control over their personal data
that they desire. The early technologies already mentioned, P3P and
Microsoft’s cookie alert, represent an initial move in this direction.70
So is the different approach pioneered by Zero Knowledge, which
allows users to adopt up to five pseudonyms or “nyms” when surfing
the Net.71 This feature provides anonymity but slows down response
rates. Yet another approach is that offered by Lifeminders, which in-
vites users to opt in to providing data about themselves in exchange
for providing targeted services to them, such as reminders of birth-
days and anniversaries of friends and relatives and easy-to-order gifts
suitable for these occasions.72 Users who sign up with Lifeminders are
told that the information they supply will be forwarded, without the
users being personally identified, to various marketers. It is possible
that a next step after Lifeminders will be companies (perhaps
Lifeminders itself) that allow consumers easily to vary how much data
they supply to websites in return for cash payments or discounts. Such
a technology will ultimately establish a true market in personal in-
formation where the suppliers of the data—individuals themselves—
control how much they want to supply and at what price. Indeed, in
69. In this connection, it is noteworthy that a number of major U.S. companies, including
Intel, AOL, and Hewlett Packard, have announced support for national privacy legislation,
marking a departure from the position of others in the private sector (reportedly including Mi-
crosoft, IBM, Yahoo, and Worldcom) that continue to advocate self-regulation as the appropri-
ate answer. Drew Clark, Privacy: Industry Split over New Senate Privacy Bill, NAT’L J. TECH.
DAILY, July 26, 2000 (PM edition); see also Amy Borrus, High Tech’s Honeymoon on the Hill
May Be About to End, BUS. WK., Nov. 13, 2000, at 69 (describing a divisive atmosphere devel-
oping on technology issues).
70. P3P has been criticized by some privacy advocates, however, for automating the trans-
fer of information and thereby threatening privacy. Nathaniel Wice, Privacy Critics Slam Project
Backed by White House, AOL and Microsoft, TIME DIGITAL (June 23, 2000), at
http://www.time.com/time/digital/daily/0,2822,48014,00.html (on file with the Duke Law Jour-
nal).
71. Jeffrey Rosen, The Eroded Self, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2000, § 6, at 46.
72. John Schwartz, ‘Opting In’: A Privacy Paradox, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 2000, at H1.
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principle, there is no reason why some individuals should be pre-
vented from allowing data about them to be connected with their
identities, as long as they are aware of that connection, and presuma-
bly are compensated in some fashion (if they so desire) for being
willing to allow such transfers.
To be sure, there will be those who will object to the trafficking
in information, asserting that some things—like data—money cannot
or should not buy. These arguments are akin to those who claimed
some time back that trading in emissions should be prohibited be-
cause no price should be put on pollution. Yet markets have now
been created in emissions permits, and the results have been benefi-
cial to the environment and have reduced costs at the same time.73 I
strongly suspect that the same will happen with information flows. As
consumers become more widely aware that information about them is
valuable—and they certainly will with all of the attention focused on
this issue—they will increasingly assert control over it and ask that
policymakers let them decide for themselves whether to keep it or sell
it. In the meantime, however, until a higher awareness level is
achieved and the technologies are in place for enabling a fair market
in information, modest additional regulatory protections are appro-
priate and are likely, in at least some form, to be adopted.
B. Intellectual Property
To some producers of traditional “content”—books, records, and
movies—the advent of the Internet must have seemed like the worst
of nightmares. Here was a technology that appeared to be capable of
allowing its users to copy original material, without compensating the
creator, from a digital file located on a diskette or hard disk of some
computer or server and then to transmit it or make it available in-
stantly, not just to one or few other viewers, but to everyone else con-
nected to the Internet.
Not surprisingly, the content industry quickly fought back, per-
suading Congress to enact the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of
1998, which, among other things, made it a crime to facilitate the cir-
cumvention of lawful copyrights.74 In addition, many content produc-
73. See Richard Schmalensee et al., An Interim Evaluation of Sulfur Dioxide Emissions
Trading, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 53, 53-68 (1998).
74. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2863-65 (1998). Among other things, the Act prohibits
the manufacture, importation, or distribution of “any technology, product, service, device, com-
ponent, or part” that is “primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a
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ers used technology to prevent access to copyrighted material unless
users paid for it. Lawrence Lessig argued that the technology—or
“code,” as he put it—would be stronger than law itself.75 If users had
to pay every time they wanted to access something on the Net, there
would be no “fair use.” Furthermore, assuming the technology would
be effective that long, it promised protection forever, not just for the
twenty years of a patent or the statutory life of a copyright (life of the
creator plus seventy years).76 If Lessig were right, the libertarian ap-
proach to the Internet would become its own nightmare, affording
much greater monopoly power to content creators than Congress—or
the Constitution, for that matter—ever envisioned.
If there is one feature of the Internet revolution that has proved
constant since its beginning, it is its unpredictability. At the time the
Internet was launched in the late 1960s—as a vehicle for data com-
munications between universities and the government—few, if any,
foresaw the development a little more than two decades later of the
browser, which would launch e-commerce. Even Bill Gates has admit-
ted that his company initially missed the importance of the Internet.
Microsoft turned completely around in the mid-1990s to embrace the
Net—so much so that its tactics eventually became central targets in
the Justice Department’s antitrust lawsuit against the company.77 Al-
most immediately after Lessig’s book Code was published, the file-
sharing movement on the Internet was launched with the develop-
ment of Napster, which has allowed tens of millions of teenagers and
adults to swap digital sound recordings of major artists for free by lo-
cating copies identified on Napster’s central server. At this writing,
Napster’s continued legal status is unclear after challenge by seven-
teen record companies (supported by the Recording Industry Asso-
ciation of America).78 Even if Napster is eventually shut down, file
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.” Id. at
2864.
75. LESSIG, supra note 1, at 122-41.
76. Id. at 135-36.
77. Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson found that Microsoft had violated both sections 1 and
2 of the Sherman Act by effectively requiring its customers to deal exclusively with Microsoft,
attempting to divide markets, and evidencing unlawful intent in bundling the company’s oper-
ating system (Windows) with its browser (Internet Explorer). United States v. Microsoft Corp.,
84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 12, 50 (D.D.C. 1999). At this writing, the case is on appeal before the United
State Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
78. The lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
alleging, among other things, that by maintaining a central listing of all sound recordings avail-
able through the service, the company was facilitating circumvention of the copyright laws in
violation of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114
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sharing—which no doubt will be extended to copies of movies, books,
magazines, and software—is like a cat out of the bag. File-sharing
programs such as Gnutella, Scour Exchange, Imesh, and Freenet,
which allow users to trade digital recordings without providing a di-
rectory on a central server, almost surely will continue to exist and be
difficult, if not impossible, to halt through legal means. More impor-
tantly, although the other file-exchange programs are more difficult
to use than Napster, it is likely that they will be refined to be made
more user-friendly. Furthermore, Napster itself could be cloned off-
shore and could be difficult to halt through legal means. This remains
true even now that Napster has announced a venture with Bertels-
mann that would create a paid subscription service for music.79
In short, the technology that Lessig feared would override copy-
right law instead may now be in the process of undermining it. The
only reason for the qualification is that these file-sharing programs so
far tend to be much more difficult to use than Napster.80 The critical
question for the entire “content industry”—sound and video record-
ings, books, and software publication—is whether some new technol-
ogy will be developed that will enable the providers to transmit se-
curely any of these forms of content over the Internet without fear of
copying.
As I write this, several such efforts are under way, although their
outcomes are uncertain. Perhaps the best known is the Secure Digital
Music Initiative (SDMI), a collaborative initiative pursued by the
major record companies and others to develop a secure way of deliv-
ering sound recordings over the Net in a way that they cannot be sub-
sequently copied and transmitted to other (non-paying) users.81 Pre-
sumably, others are working independently on means of encrypting
sound recordings (and other digital files) to accomplish the same ob-
jective. A key problem with any one of these approaches is that even
F. Supp.2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 2001 WL 115033 (9th Cir. 2001). One
of Napster’s defenses is that it is an Internet service provider protected under the 1998 Digital
Millennium Copyright Act and that, like a VCR, it is used for “substantial non-infringing uses”
and thus is legally permissible. Id. at 912. Just before this Essay went to press, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction
against Napster. At this writing, Napster is reportedly still weighing its options. A Win for Intel-
lectual Property, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2001, at A30.
79. Lee Gomes et al., Bertelsmann, Napster Agree on Service, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2000, at
A3 (describing the cease-fire between Bertelsmann AG and Napster).
80. Timothy J. Mullaney, You Call This a Revolution?, BUS. WK., Sept. 18, 2000, at 28.
81. Cary Sherman, Music on the Internet: A New World Is Waiting, BROOKINGS REV., Win-
ter 2001, at 35.
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if the digital files are initially encrypted, they must be decrypted in
order to be read or played. At that point, the decrypted versions are
subject to copy and transfer.82
An alternative approach for protecting the files is for hardware
manufactures to develop new devices for reading or playing content
that can read only certain types of files, which are not then subject to
further copying. This may work reasonably well for software and
books but perhaps less well for audio or video recordings, which can
be manually copied after they are shown and then digitized for fur-
ther copying and transfer (although quality would be degraded in the
process).
What if technology cannot provide the answer? Might it not be
possible to enact new laws making file sharing of copyrighted material
illegal and to back the laws with a powerful enforcement effort? In
theory, such an approach could be tried. At least in my view, how-
ever, it is highly doubtful that Americans would tolerate for very
long, if at all, the police raiding homes and arresting teenagers for
copying music or movies. A potentially more promising enforcement
approach would be to impose liability on browsers and Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) for allowing all types of file-exchange pro-
grams to work on their services and/or software. Although it is not
clear that such a solution is even technically feasible, it would surely
be strongly contested by the ISPs in the political arena.
The problems with each of the foregoing concepts have
prompted some to think about developing a new business model for
delivering copyrighted works. One commonly mentioned approach is
for the recording companies to provide music on a subscription basis,
as the Napster-Bertelsmann deal promises.83 The premise behind this
idea seems to be that if the subscription price is low enough, users will
obey the law and pay the money rather than continue to exchange
files for free. I am skeptical that this is the case, and I am not alone.84
82. For an excellent popular guide to these and other problems posed for copyright by
peer-to-peer computing and file sharing, see Charles C. Mann, The Heavenly Jukebox,
ATLANTIC, Sept. 2000, at 39-59. Some are more optimistic that the encryption problem will be
solved. E.g., Don Clark, Napster Alliance Boosts Prospects for Encryption, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2,
2000, at B1.
83. Sherman, supra note 81, at 36.
84. E.g., Dennis K. Berman, With Technology Like This, Who Needs Napster?, BUS. WK.,
Aug. 14, 2000, at 121 (commenting that it might be difficult for the music and film industries to
create subscription-based services when Napster and Gnutella offer content for free).
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On the other hand, maybe the market would prove me (and the other
skeptics) wrong.85
Another model, suggested by Hal Varian, is that corporations
could sponsor sound recordings that help identify the music with their
companies.86 The virtue of this approach is that it does not depend on
compliance with the copyright laws. Corporations would not care if
the recordings were copied and spread like a virus over the Internet.
To the contrary, they would welcome the publicity to the extent it
promoted their particular brand. The downside is that there are cer-
tainly limits to how many companies would want to get into the re-
cording business. This means it is likely that fewer songs would be
produced and publicized if this were the only way for recording artists
to reach the masses and still be compensated in some fashion.
Another approach is for performers to return to the pre-
recording world and realize the bulk of their income through personal
performances rather than through recordings. The Internet would
enhance their appearance fees to the extent that it enabled more
people to copy and trade digital files containing their songs. In this
sense, the Internet would return the music industry to its pre-
recording roots, when performers earned their living through live per-
formances—but with the vastly augmented power of the Internet to
enhance their fame. Such a personal performance model cannot res-
cue the e-book, software, or videos from the royalty-destroying fea-
tures of file sharing in the absence of new technology. Accordingly,
peer-to-peer computing may prevent the emergence of an economi-
cally viable way of distributing these other forms of content over the
Internet.
Finally, it is conceivable that the concern about file sharing, at
least with respect to the music industry, has been overdone. Perhaps
file-sharing services such as Napster, Gnutella, and Freenet actually
promote the sales of CDs because they familiarize many people with
particular songs quickly. It might be the case that the new listeners
are then induced to go out and buy CDs that sound better to them
when played on recorders than music played through computers. Of
course, critics would respond that as long as something like Napster
85. One poll of Napster-using college students indicates that 68% of them would be willing
to pay as much as $15 per month for a music subscription service. Spencer Ante, Napster: Tune
In, Turn On, Pay Up, BUS. WK., Nov. 13, 2000, at 52. In addition, some technologists are opti-
mistic that the Napster-Bertelsmann combination can develop software that will prevent unlaw-
ful file sharing. Id.
86. Mann, supra note 82, at 54.
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exists in its current form, consumers have no incentive to buy new
CDs because it is so easy to “burn” customized CDs from the files
downloaded for free off the Net. The plaintiffs in the Napster lawsuit
also claim that the services depress the sales of recordings and point
to an alleged drop in CD sales in the college towns where Napster
first became popular.87 At this point, it is not clear who is correct.88
In the end, the libertarian model seems to be winning as applied
to copyright and the Internet. So far, technology has triumphed over
the law. As with so much else about the Internet, whether it will con-
tinue to do so cannot be predicted easily.
C. Taxation
Sales taxes are a third area of policy in which the Internet has
provoked deep controversy. As anyone who has bought something
over the Internet knows, online merchants tend to set up shop in
states that do not levy sales taxes. Under court-established nexus
standards, these merchants are prohibited from collecting use taxes
(roughly the equivalent of sales taxes on out-of-state purchases) that
consumers often owe, but generally do not pay, to the states in which
they reside.89 The nexus standards, which were first applied to mail-
order merchants, require out-of-state merchants to have a physical
presence in the consumer’s state before they can be required to col-
lect such taxes. The Supreme Court has held that otherwise it would
be an undue burden on interstate commerce to require all vendors to
collect such taxes.90
For all cyber-libertarians, the arrival of the Internet has been a
blessing, for it constrains and ultimately may inhibit state and local ju-
risdictions. For these local administrations, whether they be Demo-
crats or Republicans, the Internet is a nightmare for the same reason.
87. For an example of such a claim, see Michael Fine, Soundscan Study on Napster Use and
Loss of Sales 1-2 (June 12, 2000), Recording Industry Association of America,
http://www.riaa.com/napster_legal.cfm (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
88. There may be a distinct generational difference in the willingness of Napster’s users to
pay for CDs. In particular, baby boomers who have been accustomed to paying for music all of
their lives may feel more compulsion to pay for a CD after locating a song through Napster than
teenagers or those in their twenties. Anna Wilde Mathews, Web Music Isn’t Just for Kids, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 26, 2000, at B1.
89. See Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 313 (1992) (stating that nexus requirements
“limit the reach of state taxing authority so as to ensure that state taxation does not unduly bur-
den interstate commerce”).
90. Id.; see also Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 759 (1967)
(invalidating an Illinois use tax statute as an undue burden on interstate commerce).
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Not only does it threaten to undermine one of the most important
sources of state and local government revenue, but it also gives what
certainly looks like an unfair advantage to online retailers.
For now, Congress has imposed a moratorium on Internet-
specific taxes that is set to expire on October 1, 2001.91 In 1999, Con-
gress also established a Commission on Internet Taxation, which was
chaired by Governor James Gilmore of Virginia and charged with de-
veloping recommendations supported by at least two-thirds of the
members. The commission was unable to do so, however, in its com-
pleted report in March of 2000. Nonetheless, a majority supported a
five-year extension of the Internet-specific tax moratorium and rec-
ommended that digital products downloaded over the Internet (such
as software, books, or music) not be subject to sales tax.92
So far, at least, there is no crisis at hand. In the first government
report on Internet commerce, the Bureau of the Census put the total
value of retail e-commerce in the fourth quarter of 1999 at a little
more than $5 billion, which translates into an annual volume of
roughly $20 billion. At this rate, e-commerce represents only 0.64%
of retail sales.93 Taking account of various exemptions to the sales tax,
the most reliable recent estimate indicates that e-commerce is costing
states and local governments throughout the country only a little
more than $400 million, or less than 0.05% of their revenue.94 This is
at a time when state and local governments collectively have been
running large surpluses.95 Even if e-commerce grows rapidly in the
years ahead, as long as the overall economy stays healthy, state and
local governments as a whole almost certainly will continue to reap
large surpluses.
Nonetheless, there is a legitimate fairness issue posed by the ef-
fective tax-free status of goods and services sold over the Net versus
in-person sales in the physical world that are subject to state or local
taxes in most jurisdictions. Moreover, it is certainly possible that one
day the revenue loss will be significant, requiring state and local gov-
91. VandeHei & Rodgers, supra note 59, at A17.
92. Advisory Commission on Electronic Commerce, Report to Congress 19 (Apr. 2000),
http://www.ecommercecommission.org/acec_report.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
93. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 33, at 9.
94. Austan Goolsbee & Jonathan Zittrain, Evaluating the Costs and Benefits of Taxing
Internet Commerce, NAT’L TAX J., Sept. 1999, at 417.
95. The total surplus enjoyed by state and local governments was $41.7 billion in 1998 and
$50 billion in 1999. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 371 (Feb. 2001),
http://w3.access.gpo.gov/eop (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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ernments and/or the federal government to respond. What are the ba-
sic options?
One possible outcome is for technology to come to the rescue, in
the form of easy-to-use software for calculating use taxes. With the
development of such software, which presumably could be kept up to
date despite the complexity and diversity of sales tax structures in
thousands of state and local jurisdictions, it presumably would no
longer be a significant burden on interstate commerce for online ven-
dors to collect use taxes owed by their customers. Having the soft-
ware available, however, does not mean that it would be used. Con-
gress most likely would have to enact legislation, after appropriate
hearings and fact-finding establishing the low cost of the software,
mandating that all vendors collect use taxes. Presumably, such a law
would be challenged in court. With the findings of fact in place, there
would be a strong case that changes in technology since the Supreme
Court last spoke on the matter (in the Quill decision in 1992)96 war-
rant modification or elimination of the nexus requirement. Collection
of use taxes no longer would seem to represent an undue burden on
interstate commerce.
A variation of the vendor mandate, ostensibly to reduce the costs
imposed on the vendors of collecting the state and local taxes, would
be to give that function to a “trusted third party” such as a credit card
company or a new governmental or quasi-governmental organization.
The key objection to this idea, however, is that unlike any individual
vendor, which would maintain customer records only for its sales, a
trusted third party would have records of all of the online (and possi-
bly mail-order) purchases by customers.97 Such an organization would
pose a much greater threat to customer privacy, especially if its rec-
ords could be easily obtained under court order, than would be the
case if individual vendors each remitted the taxes owed. For this rea-
son alone, the trusted third party “solution” seems nonviable.98
Another possible outcome is that states and localities will har-
monize their sales tax structures so that the complexities now present
would narrow or disappear. Jurisdictions could still charge different
tax rates, but eliminating or reducing differences in tax bases would
96. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 313 (1992).
97. See MANN ET AL., supra note 1, at 92-93 (“[A]n individual’s identity and purchasing
habits would be in the hands of a TTP [trusted third party].”).
98. For other objections to the concept, especially as applied in an international context,
see id.
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also undermine the argument that collection of use taxes on out-of-
state consumers represents an undue burden on interstate commerce.
In fact, to the extent that harmonization occurs, it would make the job
of software developers that much easier. If tax structures are harmo-
nized, it may also be politically easier for Congress to enact legislation
mandating the collection of use taxes by online and mail-order mer-
chants.
Still, there are major political hurdles to both the technology and
harmonization solutions to the sales tax problem posed by e-
commerce. It will be difficult, to say the least, for the large number of
taxing jurisdictions—in excess of 30,000—to obtain agreement on
anything, let alone on something as complex as some of the sales and
use taxes that many of them now levy. Moreover, any congressional
mandate would be sure to rouse the ire of the online and mail-order
vendor communities, and it would be portrayed by other opponents
as the equivalent of a national sales tax. Supporters, including many
Main Street small businesses, would respond that requiring vendors
to collect use taxes is not only fair but simply ensures that use taxes
not now being paid are in fact collected.
My own view is that Congress will be reluctant to impose a na-
tional mandate to collect use taxes as long as states and localities are
running large surpluses. Even if surpluses dwindle or turn to deficits,
the natural response of local and state jurisdictions will not be to wait
for Congress to act but instead to take matters into their own hands
and turn to other sources of revenue, most likely income-based taxes.
Such an outcome is hardly undesirable. As it is, given their many ex-
emptions, sales taxes reach only about 40% of total consumption and
are not as progressive as income taxes.99
In the end, cyber-libertarians may win the battle but lose the war
on taxes. Although our political system may not be able to muster the
support for nationalizing the sales tax, the need for local and state
government revenue will remain. The net result is likely to be a grad-
ual replacement of the sales tax with income taxes. The Internet will
not cause the government to wither away but rather to reinvent itself
so that it can continue to deliver the services that citizens have come
to expect and demand.
99. Hal R. Varian, Taxation of Electronic Commerce, Internet Policy Institute, at
http://www.internetpolicy.org/briefing/4_00_story.html (Apr. 2000) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
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D. Broadband Access
One of the great virtues of the Internet is that, at least so far, it
has been inexpensive for anyone to get on. This is largely because of
intense competition among ISPs and flat-rate pricing (unlike in
Europe and other countries). Current law mandates that ISPs lease
facilities from the telephone companies for a good reason: the Re-
gional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) whose lines are leased
have a monopoly in providing access to the home over (copper) tele-
phone wires.100 The best known ISP is American Online, which bun-
dles its own content with the ISP service for which it charges residen-
tial customers approximately $22 per month (at this writing). Some
ISPs, such as Juno, are free (and are supported by advertisers).
The next phase of Internet development is tied to the develop-
ment of higher-speed, “broadband” Internet services (at speeds ex-
ceeding one megabit, in contrast to most current modems, which op-
erate at fifty-six kilobits, or kbps). Broadband technologies include
delivery of data through coaxial cable lines, conventional copper
wires upgraded through DSL technology, and, eventually, through
wireless devices (especially once advanced third-generation stan-
dards, such 3G, are rolled out) or satellite technology. As of mid-year
2000, approximately 4.3 million homes—only a small fraction of
households—had some kind of broadband service.101
One of the more controversial policy questions associated with
the rollout of broadband is whether any or all of the providers should
be required to lease their facilities to other ISPs in the same way that
ISPs are now guaranteed access over telephone lines.102 This issue
bears strong similarities to others that have just been addressed.
Should policymakers intervene in a nascent market and impose a
regulatory regime? Or should they wait to see if competitive prob-
lems with cable broadband materialize, and act only if they do?
Should the same regulatory regime apply to all broadband provid-
ers—specifically to cable and the telephone companies—or should a
100. The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 201 (1994), was enacted in part to
facilitate competition in local telecommunications services. Since the Act’s passage, some com-
petition has emerged, primarily from Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (CLECs).
101. John R. Wilkie, Cable-Line Accord Is near in AOL Case, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 2000, at
A3, A16.
102. Robert W. Crandall & Jerry A. Hausman, Competition in U.S. Telecommunications
Services: Effects of 1996 Legislation, in DEREGULATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES: WHAT’S
NEXT? 74, 80-82 (Sam Peltzman & Clifford Winston eds., 2000), http://www.aei.brookings.org/
publications/books/deregulation.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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special “open access” policy apply only to DSL provided by the
RBOCs? Can any response be effective?
The open-access debate first surfaced on the political scene
shortly after AT&T purchased two of the nation’s largest cable sys-
tems, TCI and Media One, and promised to develop a package of
Internet, television, and telephone service through the coaxial cable
wires of each system. American Online (AOL) objected soon thereaf-
ter, fearing that AOL either would not be carried at all on the new
broadband networks or would be disadvantaged in pricing or some
other way. After all, AT&T then had an interest in its own competing
Internet portal service, Excite@Home. AOL’s complaints had reso-
nance if for no other reason than that AT&T was broken up in the
early 1980s—after a lengthy federal antitrust investigation and law-
suit—precisely because it had used its monopoly control over local
telephone service to frustrate interconnection by competing long-
distance providers, most notably MCI. If monopoly cable companies
also carried their own content—including an Internet portal service—
then they arguably would have the same incentives and ability to dis-
criminate against competing content providers and ISPs.
AOL pleaded its case before the Federal Communications
Commission as well as before numerous local jurisdictions, which had
authority over local cable franchises and were therefore required to
approve the transfer of those franchises from TCI and Media One, re-
spectively, to AT&T. Although the FCC rejected AOL’s complaints,
AOL had more success with two localities—Portland, Oregon, and
Broward County in Florida. Each imposed an “open access” require-
ment on AT&T as a condition to approving the transfer of the cable
franchise.103
The FCC opposed these local ordinances on both legal and sub-
stantive grounds.104 Legally, the FCC claimed that it had exclusive ju-
risdiction over cable issues and that a series of local ordinances would
make it impossible to have a national policy on the subject. In short,
the FCC demanded the right of federal preemption.
As a matter of policy, the FCC initially agreed with AT&T and
various academic scholars that regulatory intervention requiring
AT&T or any other would-be broadband service provider to provide
103. John Schwartz, Open-Access Online Fight Escalates, WASH. POST, July 28, 1999, at E1.
104. Brief of Amicus Curiae Federal Communications Commission, AT&T Corp. v. City of
Portland, No. 99-35,609 (9th Cir. June 22, 2000), http://techlawjournal.com/courts/portland/
19990816fcc.htm (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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equivalent access to other service providers was highly premature.105
The broadband market was in its infancy. No one at that point (1998-
99), or for that matter even today, could or can predict with confi-
dence that broadband cable will so dominate the broadband business
that it will have monopoly power. Cable faced then, and still faces to-
day, strong competition from DSL, whether provided by the RBOCs
or various independents, and potentially from wireless and satellite
services. Ordinarily, government regulation designed to thwart the
exercise of monopoly is not imposed unless and until a monopoly ac-
tually exists (as occurred in the past in the telephone and electricity
markets). Then and today, no such monopoly exists in broadband.
The FCC was concerned about premature regulation for another
important reason. Imposing open access on cable would allow other
providers to “free ride” on AT&T’s planned investment in the new
cable broadband service. This would diminish AT&T’s incentives to
roll out an attractive combination of telecommunications services that
would compete directly against the RBOCs. This last point was espe-
cially important to the FCC because of its desire to generate meaning-
ful competition in voice telephony at the local level.
For all these reasons, the FCC joined with AT&T in challenging
the Portland ordinance in federal court. In early 2000, the FCC and
AT&T were largely successful when a panel of the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit agreed that the FCC had exclusive jurisdic-
tion.106 At the same time, the court also held that cable broadband was
a “telecommunications service” of the type that the RBOCs currently
provide.107 This was important because it is the fact that the RBOCs
offer a “telecommunications service” that makes them subject to FCC
rules (one of which is an open access requirement for ISPs). The deci-
sion, therefore, effectively invited the FCC to resolve whether it was
time to apply the same policy toward cable broadband. In late Sep-
tember 2000, the FCC opened a broad inquiry into the subject of
broadband access policy, but it is not expected to act until at least
some time in 2001.108
This brings us back squarely to the policy issues. The fact re-
mains that although it is widely hailed as the future of the Internet,
105. Id.
106. AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 879-80 (9th Cir. 2000).
107. Id. at 878.
108. The FCC opened its Notice of Inquiry on September 28, 2000. Federal Communica-
tions Commission Notice of Inquiry, In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Inter-
net Over Cable and Other Facilities, GN Docket No. 00-185, FCC 00-355 (Sept. 28, 2000).
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broadband is still a very new technology. It is also the case that no
one can predict with confidence which, if any, of the various means of
delivering it will ever dominate the market. Take AT&T itself. At the
time of its two cable mergers, there was widespread expectation that
AT&T had the potential winning formula in the broadband race. Yet
by the summer of 2000, AT&T’s cable units were giving away the
service for limited times in some locations to jump-start the market
because the roll out of the service was behind the company’s an-
nounced schedule. In late October, after the company’s stock price
had fallen by roughly two-thirds from early in the summer, AT&T
announced that it was splitting itself into four pieces, one of which
would offer broadband services. All these events cast a pall over cable
broadband service, which, although it was the most popular way of
delivering high-speed access in mid-year 2000, was still growing at a
far slower rate than DSL.109
Of course, DSL is not without its own problems. Given the limits
of the technology, DSL service can work only for customers who are
located within about three miles of a central switch.110 This leaves out
many residential customers. In addition, complaints have been wide-
spread about the service interruptions and problems of DSL installers
associated with the service. Finally, although wireless Internet serv-
ices are taking off in Europe and Japan, they are in their infancy in
this country.
In short, the broadband market is very much in flux. So is the en-
tire communications market. Some time after the AT&T cable merg-
ers, AOL announced its acquisition of Time Warner, one of the larg-
est content companies in the world (with its television, music,
publishing and magazine businesses), as well as the owner of cable
systems in parts of the country. Immediately after the merger, AOL
changed its tune on the mandating of open access for cable.111 Now
AOL said that although it planned to provide access to other ISPs
voluntarily, it was better for the market to handle the issue than for
government to interfere with a mandate.112 The Federal Trade Com-
109. Wilkie, supra note 101. Of the 4.3 million broadband lines in service in mid-year 2000,
2.2 million were cable, and DSL stood at about 1 million. DSL service was up 157% during the
first six months of the year, far outdistancing cable’s growth of 59% during the same period. Id.
110. Peter S. Goodman, Dishing Up a New Link to the Internet, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2000,
at A1.
111. Ariana Eunjung Cha & Peter S. Goodman, AOL, Time Warner Try to Allay Fears,
WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2000, at E1.
112. Id. AT&T, too, said that it would allow access by other ISPs once its contract with Ex-
cite expired in 2002. Any open access conditions imposed on AOL–Time Warner need not be
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mission (and implicitly the FCC) called AOL’s bluff, insisting that
AOL–Time Warner carry at least three other ISPs on their cable lines
as a condition for approving the merger.113
The open access conditions imposed on AOL–Time Warner do
not necessarily mean that all cable providers should be subject to the
same requirement—an issue which is at the heart of the FCC’s ge-
neric inquiry into broadband policy. The fact remains that there is a
great deal of uncertainty in the broadband market. The AOL–Time
Warner marriage differs from the AT&T combinations with Media
One and TCI, respectively, in that no other ISP (including AT&T)
comes close to AOL’s customer base of nearly twenty-five million.114
Furthermore, AT&T was required, as a condition of its merger with
Media One, either to spin off its holdings of content provider Liberty
Media or its 25% stake in Time Warner (eventually, AT&T chose the
latter).115 In contrast, the AOL–Time Warner combination has
stronger incentives—given AOL’s dominance as an ISP and the
strong content position of Time Warner—not to lease space to rival
ISPs than is the case for AT&T.
Moreover, looking to the future, it bears reemphasizing that no
one knows at this point whether any particular broadband technology
or company will prove to be dominant. Under these circumstances,
“open access” regulation is premature. Regulation is appropriate only
if the broadband market (in any relevant geographic region) comes to
be dominated by one, or possibly two, competitors.
The regulation of broadband also is not like regulation of other
aspects of the Net. Government clearly can be effective in this regard
any time it wants, precisely because the providers cannot easily es-
cape jurisdiction. Telephone and cable companies must locate their
facilities physically within the United States to provide broadband
services. Satellites orbit above the earth, technically outside this coun-
try’s jurisdiction, but consumers cannot receive the signals without
having receivers that are physically located within this country. The
wireless providers also cannot provide service in this country without
having legal rights to the airspace—or the spectrum, to be precise—to
applicable to AT&T’s ownership of cable systems, because AT&T’s content service pales in
numbers compared to the millions of AOL users.
113. FTC Approves AOL/Time Warner Merger with Conditions, at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/
2000/12/aol.htm (Dec. 14, 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
114. Seth Schiesel, Dissecting the Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2000, at C18.
115. Christopher Stern, AT&T to Spin Off Liberty Media Group, WASH. POST, Nov. 16,
2000, at E1.
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deliver their content. In short, those who provide Internet service can
be regulated if the policymakers deem it necessary. It is premature to
conclude that this must be the case, however, at least across the
board.
Finally, what about the claim by the RBOCs that if broadband
cable is not to be subject to open access rules—at least not yet—then
they should not be either? Aren’t the telephone companies subject to
the same disincentives in rolling out DSL that the cable providers
purportedly would be if they were subject to open access rules? The
short answer seems to be “yes,” and thus the most supportable out-
come would appear to be to give the RBOCs parity with the cable
companies under whatever regime is finally decided. That is, if cable
companies are to be subject to open access, then so should the
RBOCs (as they are now). If cable broadband providers are not to be
subject to open access rules, then neither should the RBOCs—at
least, not until it becomes clear that one of the broadband technolo-
gies (and thus one of the providers) assumes a dominant position that
would require regulation.
III.  WHO REGULATES?
I shall conclude by providing a few thoughts on one of the most
fascinating but challenging aspects of the Internet—namely, who gov-
erns the Net—and the policy issues it raises.
Begin with the governance of the Net itself. Somewhat remarka-
bly, there is no governmental entity that sets the rules for communi-
cating on the Internet. Instead, the Net so far has been loosely gov-
erned by self-governing bodies that are totally independent of any
government.
For example, the languages that enable computers to speak to
one another—the so-called “protocols,” of which the hypertext trans-
fer protocol (http) and the hypertext markup language (HTML) are
the most famous—tend to be developed by individual programmers,
or groups of programmers. These languages are then approved by
standards bodies, such as the Internet Task Force or the Worldwide
Web Consortium. Government—more precisely the U.S. govern-
ment—was heavily involved for much of the early history of the
Internet in establishing and operating the domain name registration
system through subcontractors such as the Internet Assigned Num-
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bers Authority (IANA) and Network Solutions, Inc.116 This was un-
derstandable. The U.S. government, after all, had funded the creation
of the Internet.
In 1998, however, the U.S. government heeded calls from both
inside and outside this country that the domain name system could
not operate indefinitely as a U.S. governmental operation.117 Instead,
said the argument, the Internet must be devolved to the private sec-
tor, ideally in a competitive fashion. Accordingly, in 1998, the Clinton
administration called on the private sector to create its own nonprofit
organization to manage the domain name and address system.118 The
result was the formation of the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN). ICANN has managed a transition
from a two-year period when its nineteen directors were appointed to
a body whose directors are elected by Internet users.119 At this writing,
it is in the process of transferring its monopoly over domain name
registrations to a competitive environment.120
There are many issues that ICANN confronts going forward,
even after its selection in November 2000 of seven additional top
level domain names (beyond the existing .org, .com, and .edu).121
Among the issues facing the organization are the way it manages elec-
tions for its directors, and what role, if any, it may or will play in fa-
cilitating the resolution of security issues that have arisen on the Net
(especially in the wake of various viruses that have, at times, destabi-
lized use of the Net around the world). Space is too short to delve
into these subjects here.122 I simply note that a body such as ICANN is
essentially unprecedented. Historically, governments themselves have
created their own multilateral organizations—such as the United Na-
tions, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, and the
116. Developments—The Law of Cyberspace, supra note 1, at 1660-62.
117. Froomkin, supra note 4, at 24; Weinberg, supra note 4, at 204-09.
118. For an excellent discussion of the history, see MANN ET AL., supra note 1, at 158-64.
119. Weinberg, supra note 4, at 225-49.
120. ICANN Announces Selections for New Top-Level Domains, at
http://www.icann.org/announcements/icann-pr16nov00.htm (Nov. 16, 2000) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
121. Ariana Eunjung Cha, Seven New Domain Suffixes Approved, WASH. POST, Nov. 17,
2000, at E1.
122. For thorough discussions of this topic, see Developments—The Law of Cyberspace, su-
pra note 1, at 1660-80. See generally Froomkin, supra note 4 (discussing the history and devel-
opment of ICANN and concluding that its future mission should be limited to provide a more
decentralized, diverse, and competitive approach to the domain name system); Weinberg, supra
note 4 (discussing the legitimacy problem and concluding that ICANN should minimize its poli-
cymaking role in order to address concerns related to its exercise of public power).
LITAN 03/08/01  11:09 AM
2001] LAW & POLICY IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET 1083
World Trade Organization—to deal with issues that require some
form of multi-national, or extranational, governance. In turn, repre-
sentatives of the governments that created and still fund these bodies
also manage them. Can ICANN, which is no longer supported finan-
cially by any government, continue to “govern” cyberspace—to the
limited degree that it must—and yet remain independent? Will it be
asked to take on issues, such Internet security, which could well lead
to some type of multi-government involvement? No one can know
the answers for sure, but it is certainly premature to assume that the
cyber-libertarian model of the Net—which has envisioned no gov-
ernmental involvement in governance at all—will continue to be the
model for Internet governance in perpetuity.
An equally complex set of issues relates to the questions about
jurisdiction on the Internet. Whose law governs taxation, privacy, in-
tellectual property, consumer fraud, and so many other physical
world issues that have their counterparts in cyberspace? These ques-
tions are difficult enough when applied to transactions and interac-
tions between parties located within one country, such as the United
States, but they become even more difficult to answer when the inter-
actions involve parties residing in or organized in different countries.
This subject deserves an article- or book-length treatment that it
will not receive here. There is no getting away from the complex
choice-of-law questions that inevitably surface on the Internet.
In the long run, however, the appropriate path is clear. Nations
should do their best to harmonize their different subject matter laws,
or at least enable them to be “interoperable” so that needless con-
flicts do not arise.123 In fact, there are a number of cross-border initia-
tives already underway in the areas of commercial law and contracts
to develop model laws that would advance this objective.124 This is the
best that can be hoped for as a united world government is out of the
question at any time in the near future.
Meanwhile, in the short run—and perhaps for some significant
time for many areas of the law—nations will continue to differ.
Whose law will govern in cyberspace? A good first answer is that al-
though the Internet is a new medium of communication, it need not—
indeed should not—require changing the rules about which law ap-
plies to commercial dealings. Typically, that law is governed by the
contract dictated by the seller, and it stays that way unless the buyer
123. This is a major theme running through MANN ET AL., supra note 1.
124. Id. at 143-45.
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has significant market power to change the terms. In fact, contracts
typically spell out not only the jurisdiction (often the home country
where the seller does business or from where it ships its goods) whose
law is to apply in the event of a later dispute but also the procedure
for resolution, whether it be lodging a complaint in the courts of the
seller, or, in some cases, proceeding through binding arbitration or
some other form of alternative dispute resolution. This is the way
business is conducted now through the mail, by fax, or on the tele-
phone, and the Internet should be no different. Nonetheless, interest
in and demand for more efficient means of dispute resolution will
grow. Otherwise, there will be a limit to the volume of cross-border
transactions conducted through the Internet.
For this reason, there has been some interest in “cyber-tribunals”
that would allow parties on both sides of e-transactions to resolve
their complaints before specialized arbiters or private judges in cyber-
space, without the parties (especially the buyers) having to travel to
distant locations and to argue before foreign courts or arbitration
panels.125 The Federal Trade Commission, which has advocated the
creation of these cyber-ADR mechanisms, has also suggested that
resolution (and avoidance) of disputes would be easier if govern-
ments developed model contracts that consumers and businesses
could use in completing Net-based commercial transactions.126
Whether these kinds of tribunals or standardized contracts will take
off remains to be seen. In the meantime, however, it is “buyer be-
ware” on the Net: buy something in cyberspace and expect your
transaction to be covered by the law of the jurisdiction chosen by the
seller.
CONCLUSION
This Essay has touched on some of those challenges and how
they might be resolved. I have argued that the solutions are not likely
to rest solely with the market or with government, but instead by a
125. The formation of such tribunals is one of the recommendations of a report on jurisdic-
tion in cyberspace issued by the Section of Business Law of the American Bar Association,
Achieving Legal and Business Order in Cyberspace: Jurisdictional Issues Created by the Internet
(n.d.), http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/cyber/initiatives/jurisdiction.html (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
126. For more details, see Consumer Protection in the Electronic Marketplace: Looking
Ahead, at www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/09/globalecommfin.htm (Sept. 6, 2000) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
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mix of both the market (and technology) and regulation, depending
on the particular issue.
This eclectic conclusion almost certainly will not satisfy those in
either the libertarian or the regulatory camp. I hope to have shown
that there is not much reason to expect that the mix of markets and
government that we find in real life will be materially different in cy-
berspace. To be sure, the nature of the technology should tilt solu-
tions on the Net perhaps more in the direction of market-oriented
fixes than in the physical world, but even on the Net, technological
solutions are not often present or will not be available for some time.
In the interim, government regulation may be called for if users are to
trust the Net to do business and engage in other kinds of interaction.
A key challenge for policymakers, when they do act, is to do so
in a way that does not frustrate, and ideally that facilitates, the con-
tinued search for market-based and and/or technological solutions.
Contrary to the view of some libertarians, regulation can be effective
for the largest institutions—the “elephants”—that already have major
presence on the Internet because of the power of their brand names,
and are likely for that reason to maintain or extend that presence in
the future.
If evolution of the Internet has proven anything, it is that its
twists and turns and the policy issues that it evokes are almost impos-
sible to predict in advance. This requires that policymakers not act
prematurely. When they do act, though, they must do so pragmati-
cally and with a humility that allows for constant mid-course correc-
tions.
